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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In sustaining a state criminal statute that forbids certail'l 
expenditures by appellant banks and business corporations for 
the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the First 
Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that 
materially affect its business, property, or assets. The court 
rejected appellants' claim that the statute abridges freedom 
of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The issue presented in this context is one of first 
impression in this Court. We postponed jurisdiction to con-
sideration of the merits. 430 U. S. 964 (1977). We now 
reverse. 
I 
The statute at issue, Massachusetts General Laws ch. 55, 
§ 8, prohibits appellants, two national banking associations 
and three business corporations/ from making contributions or 
expenditures "for the purpose of ... influencing or affecting 
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than 
one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets 
1 Appellants are The First National Bank of Boston, New England 
Merchants National Bank, the Gillette Company, Digital Equipment Corp., 
and Wyman-Gordon Company. 
r' 
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of the corporation." The statute further specifies that" [n]o 
question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxa-
tion of the income, property or transactions of individuals 
shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or 
assets of the corporation." A corporation that viola.tes § 8 
is punishable by a maximum fine of $50,000; a corporate 
officer, director, or agent who violates the section is punishable 
by a fine of up to $10,000.2 
Appellants wanted to spend money to publicize their views 
on a proposed constitutional amendment that was to be sub-
mitted to the voters as a ballot question at a general election 
2 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 55, §8 (West 19-), provides (with empha-
sis supplied): 
"No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, tmst, surety, indem-
nity, sa.fe deposit , insurance, railroad, strrct railway, telegraph, telephone, 
gas electric light, hl?at, power, canal, aqueduct, or water company, no com-
pany having the right to ta·kc land by eminent domain or to exercise 
franchise'! in public ways, granted by the commonwealth or by any county, 
city or town, no trustee or trufttees owning or 'holding the ma.jorit.y of 
the stork of such a. corporation, no business corporation incorporated under 
the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth and no officer or agent 
acting in bCihalf of any corporation ment.ioned in this srction, shall directly 
or indirectly give, pay, expend o1· contribute or promise to give, pay, 
expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of 
aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or antagonizing the inter-
est-s of any political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any 
question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any 
of the property, business or assets of the corporation. No question sub-
mitted to the voters, solely concerning the taxation of the income, property 
or transactions of individuals shall be deemed mate1ially to affect the 
property, business 01' assets of the corporation. No person or persons, no 
political committee, and no person acting under the authority of a political 
committee, or in its behalf, ~:>hall solicit or receive from such corporation 
or such holders of stock any gift, payment, expenditure, contribution or 
promise to give, pay, expend or contribute for any such purpose. 
"Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars and any officer, director 
or agl?nt of the corporation violating any provision thereof, shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both." 
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on November 2, 1976. The amendment would have permitted 
the legislature to impose a graduated tax on the income of 
individuals. After the Attorney General of Massachusetts 
informed appellants that he intended to enforce § 8 against 
them, they brought this action before a single Justice of the 
Supreme Judicicial Court, seeking to have the statute declared 
unconstitutional. On April 26, 1976, the case was submitted 
on an expedited basis and agreed facts, in order to settle the 
question before the upcoming election. 3 Judgment was 
reserved and the case referred to the full court that same da.y. 
8 This was not the first challenge to § 8. The statute's legislative and 
judicial history has been a troubled one. Its succes:;;lve re-enactments have 
been linked to the legislature's repeated submissions to the voters of a 
constitutional amendment that would allow the enactment of a graduated 
tax. 
The predeces.o;or of § 8, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 55, § 7 (as amended by 1946 
Mass. Acts, ch. 537, § 10), was first challenged in Lustwerk v. Lytron, 
Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 183 N. E. 2d 871 (1962). Unlike § 8, § 7 did not 
dictate that questions concerning the taxation of individuals could not 
satisfy the "materially affecting" requiremC'nt. The Supreme Judicial 
Court construed § 7 not to prohibit a corporate expenditure urging the 
voters to reject a propo ·ed constitutional amendment authorizing the 
legislature to impose a graduated tax on corporate or personal income. 
After Lustwerk the legislature amended § 7 by adding the sentence: 
"No question submitted to the voters concerning the taxation of the 
income, properly or transactions of individuals sha.U be deemed materially 
to affect the property, businC'ss or assets of the corporation." 1972 Mass. 
Acts, ch. 458. The statute was challenged in 1972 by four of the present 
appellants; they want.C'd to oppose a referendum proposal imilar to the 
one submitted to and rejected by the voters in 1962. Again the expen-
diture was hrld to be l:nvful. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General, 362 
Mass. 570, 290 N. E. 2d 526 (1972). 
The most recC'nt amendment was enacted on April 28, 1975, when the 
legislature furt.her rC'fined the secon,d sentence of § 8 to apply only to 
ballot questions "solely" concerning the taxation of individuals. 1975 
Mass. Acts, ch. 151, § 1. Following this amendment, tho legislature on 
May 7, 1975, voted to submit t.o the voters on November 2, 1976, the 
proposed con ·:t,itutional amendment authorizing the imposition of a 
graduated personal income tax. As appellants wished to oppose this pro-
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Appellants argued that § 8 violated the First Amendment, 
ihe Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and similar provisions of the Massachu-
setts Constitution. They prayed that the statute be declared 
·unconstitutional on its face and as it would be applied t0 
their proposed expenditures. The parties' statement of agreed 
facts reflected their disagreement as to the effect that the 
adoption of a personal income tax would have on appellants' 
·business and noted that "{t]here is a division of opinion among 
economists as to whether and to what extent a graduated 
·income tax imposed solely on individuals would affect the 
· business and assets of corporations." App. 17. Appellee diCl 
not dispute that appellants' management believed that the 
tax would have a significant effect on their businesses.4 
On Septen1ber 28, 1976, the full bench directed the single 
justice to enter judgment upholding the constitutionality ot 
·§ 8. An opinion followed on February 1, 1977.5 The court 
posal, they instituted the instant action for a declaration that § 8 is 
unconstitutional. 
4 Appellants · believe that the adoption of ·a ·graduated personal income 
tax would materially affect their business.in .a variety of ways, including, in 
the words of the court below, 
'"discouraging highly qualified executives ana highly skilled professional 
persmmel from settling, working or remain'ing in Massachusetts; promot-
ing a tax climate which would be considered unfavorable by business cor-
porations, thereby discouraging them from settling in Massachusetts with 
'resultant adverse effects' on the plaintiff banks' loans, deposits, and other 
services; and tending to shrink the disposable income of individuals avail-
able for the purchase of the consumer products manufactured by at least 
'one of the plaintiff corporations." - Mass., at-, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1266. 
5 As it had done in the previous challenges to the predecessor of § 8, see 
· n. 3, supra, the court first questioned whether the statut.e rould be con-
strued not to proscribe the expenclitures appellants desired to make. The 
court concluded that it had to address appellants' constitutional challenge 
'because "[t]he statutory amendment to § 8 makes clear that the Legisla-
ture has specifically proscribed corporate expenditures of moneys relative 
to this proposed amendment." - Mass., at -, 359 N. E., at 1268. 
This was clear from the language of the second sentence of § 8 and the 
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acknowledge that § 8 "operate[s] in an area of the most fun-
damental First Amendment activities," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 14 (1976). It viewed the principal question as 
f'whether business corporations, such as [appellants], have 
First Amendment rights coextensive with those of natural 
persons or associations of natural persons." -Mass., at-, 
359 N. E. 2d, a.t 1269. The court found its answer in the 
contours of a corporation's constitutional right, as a "person" 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, not to be deprived of 
property without due process of law. Distinguishing the First 
Amendment rights of a natural person from the more limited 
rights of a corporation, the court c·oncluded that "whether its 
rights are designated 'liberty' or 'property' rights, a corpora-
tion's property and business interests are entitled to Four-
teenth Amendment protection. . . . [A]s an incident of such 
protection, corporations also possess certain rights of speech 
. and expression under the Fourteenth Amendment." Accord-
·ingly, the court held "that only when a general political issue 
-materially affects a corporation's business, property or assets 
may that corporation claim First Amendment protection for 
its speech or other activities entitling it to communicate its 
position on that issue to the general public." Since this lim-
·itation is "identical to the legislative command in the first 
sentence of [ § 8] ," the court concluded that the legislature 
"has clearly identified in the challenged statute the parameters 
of corporate free speech." ld., 13 
The court also declined to say that there was "no rational 
basis for [the] legislative determination" that a ballot ques-
tion concerning the taxation of individuals could not mate-
rially affect the interests of a corporation. Since in the court's 
view appellants had not made a sufficient showing of material 
effect, their challenge to the sta,tutory prohibition as applied 
to them failed. 
legislature's synchronized amendment of § 8 and approval of the sub-
mission of the ballot question to the voters. 
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Appellants' other arguments fared no better. Adopting a 
narrowing construction of the statute,6 the Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the contention that § 8 is overbroad. It also 
found no merit in appellants' vagueness argument because the 
·specific prohibition against corporate expenditures on a refer-
endum solely concerning individual taxation is "both precise 
and definite." ld., at -, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1273-1274.7 
Finally, the court held that appellants were not denied the 
equal -protection of the laws.8 
II 
:B'~cause the 1976 referendum has been held, and the prO'" 
pqsed constitutional amendment defeated, we face at the out-
set a question of niootness. As the case falls within the class 
~The court stated that § 8 would not prohibit the publication of 
"in-house" newspapers or communications to stockholders containn1g the 
corpora,tion's view on a graduated personal income tax; the participa.tion 
by' corporate employees, at corporate expense, in discussions or legislative 
hearings on the issue; the participation of corporate officers, directors, 
stockholders, or employees in public discussion of the issue on radio or 
television, at news conferences, or through statements to the press or 
"similar means not "invo1ving contributions or expenditures of corpora.te 
funds"; or speeches or comments by employees or officers, on working 
hours, to the press or a chamber of commerce. - Mass., a.t -, 359 
N. E. 2d, at 1272. 
7 The Court also rejected a:ppellru1ts) argument that the second sentence 
of § 8 establishes an irrebuttable presumption in viola,tion of the Due 
Process Clause. In view of our broader holding tha,t the First Amend-
ment rights of a corporation are not limited to ma.tters' affecting its busi-
ness interests, we need not reach this issue. 
8 Appellants argued that § 8 must be subjected to strict scrutiny because 
the fundamental right of freedom of speech is implicated. Having con-
cluded that a corpora.tion lacks rights under the First Amendment. except 
as incidental to its property rights, and that those rights are not infringed 
'by § 8, the court held that § 8 need be subject.ed only to "the traditional 
scrutiny in.volving economic matters." On that basis the court. sustained 
the classii1cat.ion. See n. 22, infra. Because of our disposition of appel-
lants' First Amendment claim, we need not address their equal protection 
argument. 
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of controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review," 
8outhern Pacific Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), 
we conclude that it is not moot. Present here are both ele-
ments identified in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 
(1975), as precluding a finding of mootness in the absence of a 
class action: " ( 1) the challenged action was in its duration too 
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, 
and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action 
again." 
Under no reasonably foreseeable circumstances could appel-
lants obtain plenary review by this Court of the issue here 
presented in advance of a referendum on a similar constitu-
tional amendment. In each of the legislature's four previous 
attempts to obtain constitutional authorization to enact a 
graduated income tax, including this most recent one, the 
period of time between legislative authorization of the pro-
posal and its submission to the voters was approximately 18 
months.9 Eighteen months proved too short a period of time 
for appellants to obtain complete judicial review, and there is 
every reason to believe that any future suit would take even 
longer. Furthermore, a decision allowing the desired expendi-
tures would be an empty gesture unless it afforded appellants 
sufficient opportunity prior to the election date to commu-
nicate their views effectively. 
Nor can there be any serious doubt that there is a "reason-
able expectation," Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, that appel-
lants again will be subject to the threat of prosecution under 
§ 8. The 1976 election marked the fourth time in recent years 
that a proposed graduated income tax amendment has been 
9 The proposal to amend the Constitution was approved for placement 
on the November 1962 ballot on March 29, 1961; for placement on the 
November 1968 ballot on May 10, 1967; for placement on the November 
1972 ballot on May 12, 1971; and, most recently, for placement on the 
November 1976 ballot on May 7, 1975. 
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submitted to the Massachusetts voters. Appellee's suggestion 
that the legislature may abandon its quest for a constitutional 
amendment is purely speculative.10 Appellants insist that 
they will continue to oppose the constitutional amendment, 
and there is no reason to believe that the Attorney General 
will refrain from prosecuting violations of § 8.11 Compare 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 546 (1976), 
with Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 514, 521 (1974). 
Meanwhile, § 8 remains on the books as a complete prohibi-
tion of corporate expenditures related to individual tax ref-
erenda, and as a restraining influence on corporate expendi-
·tures concerning other ballot questions. The heavy criminal 
penalties of § 8 discourage challenge by violation, and the 
-effect of the statute on arguably protected speech will per-
sist. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974); see 
American Party v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 770 n. 1 (1974); 
Rosario v. Roclcefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U. S. 300, 333 n. 2 (1972). Accordingly, we 
conclude that this case is not moot and proceed to address 
the merits. 
III 
The court below framed the principal question in this case 
as whether and to what extent corporations have First Amend-
ment rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong ques-
tion, which prompted a faulty analysis and an incorrect result. 
We begin with a reformulation of the question. The First 
10 Most of the States, and the District of Columbia, impose graduated 
personal income taxes. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
State Government Tax Collections in 1977, Table 9, at 13 (1977). Several 
States impose a graduated tax on corporate income. Advisory Comm'n 
on Intergovernmental Relations, II Significant Features of Fiscal Fed-
eralism, Table 113, at 219-222 (1976-1977 ed.). 
11 We are informed that the Attorney General also has threatened one of 
the appellants with prosecution under § 8 for an expenditure made in 
support of a local referendum proposal concerning a civic center. Brief 
'for Appellants 22 n. 7, A-1. 
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Amendment is a statement of principle, transformed by inclu-
sion in our Constitution into a command with the binding 
force of law. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-177 
( 1803). The Constitution often protects interests broader 
than those of the party seeking their vindication. The First 
Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal inter-
ests. The proper question therefore is not whether corpora-
tions "have" First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they 
are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the 
question must be whether § 8 abridges expression that the 
First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it 
does. 
A 
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the 
First Amendment's protection. 
"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by 
the Constitution embodies at the least the liberty to 
discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public con-
cern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent 
punishment. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill 
its historic function in this nation, must embrace all 
issues about which information is needed or appropriate 
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigen-
cies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 
101-102 ( 1940). 
The referendum issue that applicants wish to address falls 
squarely within this description. In appellants' view the 
enactment of a graduated personal income tax, as proposed 
to be authorized by constitutional amendment, would have a 
seriously adverse effect on the economy of the State. See 
n. 4, supra. The importance of the referendum issue to the 
people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed. Its 
merits, however, are the subject of sharp disagreement. As 
the Court said in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), 
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"there is pratically universal agreement that a major purpose 
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion 
of government affairs." 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would 
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. 
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a 
democracy,12 and this is no less true because the speech comes 
from a corporation rather than an individual.1.3 The inherent 
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the 
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual. 
The court below nevertheless held that corporate speech is 
protected by the First Amendment only when it pertains 
directly to the corporation's business interests. In deciding 
whether this novel and restrictive gloss on the First Amend-
ment comports with the Constitution and the precedents of 
"1 2 Underlying the decision in New Yo1·k Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
264 (1964), is an understanding of the "central meaning of the First 
Amendment" that gives pride of place to such speech, "speech without 
which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's phrase, 
'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and 
not 'in the people over the Government.'" Kalven, The New York Times 
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 
S. Ct. Rev. 191, 208. Freedom of expression has particular significance 
with respect to government because "[i]t is here tl1a.t the state has a spe-
cial incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power 
of suppression." T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment 9 (1966). 
13 The individual's interest in self-expression is a separate concern of 
the First Amendment, although the two often converge. See G. Gunther, 
Con titutional Law 1044 (9th ed. 1975); T. Emerson, The System of Free-
dom of Expression 6 ( 1970). The Court has proclaimed, however, that 
"[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government." Gar1·ison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 
(1964). And self-government suffers when the government suppresses 
competing views on public issues "from diverse and antagonistic sources." 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), quoted in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266 ( 1964). 
76-1172-0PINION 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON v. BELLOTTI 11 
this Court, we need not survey the oute,r boundaries of the 
Amendment's protection of corporate speech, or inquire 
whether limits may be placed on corporate political activity 
involving more than the expression of views on a public issue. 
Neither need we address the abstract question whether cor-
porations have the same rights as individuals under the First 
Amendment. The ultimate question in this case, simply put, 
is whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this 
proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitle-
ment to protection. We turn now to that question. 
B 
The court below found confirmation of the legislature's 
definition of the scope of a corporation's First Amendment 
rights in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting 
that the First Amendment is applicable to the States through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, and seizing upon 
the observation that corporations "cannot claim for them-
selves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment gua.ran-
tees," Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 ( 1925:), 
the court concluded that a corporation's First Amendment 
rights must derive from its property rights under the 
Fourteenth.14 
14 The Massachusetts court did not go so far as to accept appellee's 
argument that corporations have only those rights granted them by the 
State. Brief for Appellee 4, 23-25. It recognized that such an extreme 
position could n,ot be reconciled either with the many decisions holding 
state laws invalid tmder the Fourteenth Ame1~dment when they infringe 
protected speech by corporate bodies, e. g., Linmarlc Associates, Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro, supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448 
(1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975); Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975); Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974); New Yorlc Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 384 U.S. 374 (1967); New Yorlc 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 
360 U. S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 
' .. 
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This is an artificial mode of analysis, untenable under deci· 
sions of this Court. 
"In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this Court held that the 
liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amend· 
(1952), or with decisions affording corporations the protection of consti-
tutional guarantees other than thr First Amendm<'nt. E. g., United States 
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977) (Fifth Amendment 
double jeopardy); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 
353 (1977) (Fourth Amendmrnt). Appellee's argument to the contrary 
not only is mistaken but is inapplicable to two of the appellants. National 
banks are creatures of federal law and instrumentaliti<'s of the Federal 
Government, Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 229-230 (1903); McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and their existence is in no way 
dependent on state law. See 7 A Michie, Banks and Banking ch. 15, § 1, 
at 4 (1973). 
In cases where corporate specrh has bern denied the shelter of the 
First Amendment, there is no suggrstion that the reason was because a 
corporation rather than an individual or association was in\'olved. E. g., 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376 
(1973); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). True, the 
corporate identity of the party assrrt ing the right has been determinative 
in several decisions denying corporations certain constitutional right , such 
as the privilege against self-incrimination, Wilson v. United States, 221 
U. S. 361, 382-386 (1911), equality with individuals in the enjoyment 
' of a right to privacy, California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 
(1974); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950), and 
freedom of association, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), but this 
is not because the States arc free to define the rights of their creatures 
without constitutional limit. Oth<:'rwis0, corporations could be denied the 
protection of all constitutional guarantres, including due process and the 
'equal protection of the law. Crrtain "purely personal" guarantees, such 
as the privilege against self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations 
· and other organizations because the "historic function" of the particular 
gunrantee is limited to the protection of indi,·icluals. See United States v. 
White, 3:!2 U. S. 694, 698-701 (1944). Whether or not a particular 
guarantee JS "purely personal" or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason dep<'nds on the nature, history, and purpose of the particu-
lar constitutional provision. 
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ment guarantees against abridgment by the federal gov-
ernment is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from inva-
sion by state action. That principle has been followed 
and reaffirmed to the present day." Jo~eph Bur~tyn, Inc. 
v. Wil~on, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 (1952) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
Freedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by 
the First Amendment always have been viewed as funda-
mental components of tho liberty safeguarded by the Due 
Process Clause, see Gitlow, supra, at 666 (opinion of the 
Court), 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Alabama., 357 
U. S. 449, 460 (1958); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 
368 (1931); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937); 
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1926), and the Court has not 
identified a separate source for the right when it has been 
asserted by corporations.15 See, e. g., Times Film Corp. v. 
City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 47 (1961); King~ley Int'l Pic-
ture~ Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959); Joseph 
Burstyn, supra. In Grosjean v. Ameriuan Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 244 ( 1936), the Court rejected the very reasoning adopted 
by the Supreme Judicial Court and did not rely on the cor-
poration's property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
in sustaining its freedom of speech.16 
1 5 It has been settled for almost a centur:v that corporations are persons 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santa Clara County v. 
Southem Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394 (1886); see Covington & Lexington 
Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896). 
16 Compare II ague v. C/0, 307 U. S. 496, 518 (1939) (opinion of Stone, 
,T.), with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
The semantic reasoning of the court below would lead logically to the 
conclusion that the protection afforded speech by corporations, or, for that 
matter other artificial entities and associations, would differ depending on 
whether the source of the alleged abridgment was a State or the Federal 
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Yet appellee contends that First Amendment rights are lim-
ited to those corporations that are engaged in the communica-
tions business and to corporations through which individuals 
express themselves, and the Court below apparently adopted 
the "materially affecting" theory as the conceptual common 
denominator between appellee's position and the precedents 
· of this Court. 
It is · true that the matcrial1y affecting requirement would 
· have' been satisfied in the Court's decisions affording protec-
tion to · newspapers, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
· supra; Grosjean, supra, to magazines, e. ·g.,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
·· 385 U.S. 374 (1967), to the speech of corporations otherwise 
· engaged in the business of communication or entertainment, 
e. g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422"'U. S. 922 (1975); South-
. eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975); 
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, supra; Joseph Bur-
styn, supra, to the "commercial speech" of business corpora-
tions, e. g., Linmark Associates,1nc. v. 'Township of Willing-
boro, 431 U. S. 85 (1977), arid to the protected speech of 
employers in the context of labor relations, NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,617-618 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia 
Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469 (1941). But the effect on 
the business of the corporation was not the rationale support-
ing any of these decisions. None of them mentions, let alone 
attributes significance to the fact, that the subject of the chal-
lenged communication materially affected the corporation's 
.. business. 
'Government. But the view that the States ma,y have more la.titude than 
Congress to 'abridge freedom of speech has not commanded the assent 
of a majority of this Court . See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 291-292 
(1976) (opinion of REHNQ.UIST,. J.); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
500-503 Cl957) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois , 343 U. S. 
250, '288-295 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Since the distinction 
between liberty and property is nonexistent in the First Amendment itself, 
'it would he anomalous to say that a corporation's right to free speech 
·under the Fourteenth AmendmC'nt somehow must be linked to that Amend-
·ment's protection of property rights. 
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The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally 
recognized role of the press in informing and educating the 
public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion 
and debate. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.,, at 219; see Sa:cbe v. 
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 943,863-864 (1974) (PowELL, 
J., dissenting). But the press does not have a monopoly on 
either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten. Cf. 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 390; New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266. Similarly, the deci-
sions involving corporations in the business of communication 
or entertainment are based on the dual role of the First 
Amendment in fostering individual self-expression and afford-
ing the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, supra; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, at 389; Winters v. New York, 333 
U. S. 507, 510 ( 1948). 
Nor do our recent commercial speech cases lend support to 
appellee's business interest theory. They illustrate that the 
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and 
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the 
public may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitu-
tionally protected not so much because it pertains to the 
seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in 
the "free flow of commercial information." Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U. S. 748, 764 (1976); see Linmark Associates, supra.17 
17 It ;s somewhat ironic that appelle seeks t.o reconcile these decisions 
with the "materially affecting" concept by noting that the commercial 
spt?aker would "have a direct financial interest in the speech," Brief for 
Appellee 19, and n. 12. Until recently, the "purely commercial" nature 
of an advertisement was thought to undPrmine ::tnd even n,Pgate its entitle-
ment to the sanctuary of the First Amendment. Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942); see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 822 
(1975); Virginia Pharmacy, supra. Appelle would invert the debate by 
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c 
We find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendments, 
or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that 
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the 
First Amendment loses that protection simply because its 
source is a corporation that cannot prove a material effect on 
its business or property. The "materially affecting" require-
·ment is not an identification of the boundaries of corporate 
speech etched by the Constitution itself. Rather, it amounts 
to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on 
its cont.ent. 
Section 8 permits a corporation to communicate to the pub-
lic its views on certa.in referendum subjects-those materially 
affecting its business-but not others. It also singles out one 
kind of ballot question-individual taxation-as a subject 
about which corporations may never make their ideas public. 
The legislature has drawn the line 'between permissible and 
impermissible speech a,ccording to its content: whether there 
is a sufficient nexus, as defined by the -legislature, between the 
issue presented to the voters and the business interests of the 
speaker.18 
·giving constitutional significance to a corporation's "hawking of wares" 
while approving criminal sanctions for a bank's expression of opinion on a 
tax law of general public interest. 
In emphasizing the societal interest and the fact that this Court's deci-
sions have not turned on the effect upon the "speaker's" business interests, 
wo do not say that -&tch interests may not be relevant or important in a 
different context. 
18 Even assuming that the rationale behind the materially affecting 
requirement itself were unobjectionable, the limitation in § 8 still would 
'have an impermissible chilling effect on protected speech. Much valuable 
informatiun which a corporation might be able to provide would remain 
unpublished because corporate management would not be willing to risk 
the substantial criminal penalties-personal as well as corporate-provided 
for in § 8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279 (1964); 
Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 
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What was said in Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 9·2 (1972), is equally applicable here: 
"The central problem with [the sta,tute] is that it 
describes permissible [speech] in terms of its subject 
matter. . . . But, above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content." 
I d., at 95; see cases cited therein. Abhorrence of censorship 
is basic to the theory of the First Amendment, and " [ t] he 
essence of this forbidden censorship is content control." I d., 
at 96. In the realm of pure speech, the legislature is constitu-
tionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which 
persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public 
issue. If a legislature may direct business corporations to 
"stick to business," it also may limit other corporations-
religious, charitable, or civic-to their respective "business" 
when addressing the public. Especially where, as here, the 
legislature suppresses speech in an attempt to give one side 
of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its 
views to the people/0 the First Amendment is offended unless 
U. S. 513, 52(\ (1958). As the facts in this case illustrate, management 
could never be sure whether a court would dis.'tgree with its judgment as 
to the effect upon the corporation's business of a particular referendum 
issue. In addition, the burden and expense of litigating the i u~espe­
cially when what must be established is a complex and amorphous eco-
nomic relationship-would unduly impinge on the exercise of the con-
stitutional right. "[T] he free dissemination of ideas [might] be the loser." 
Smith v. California, supra; sec Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 59-60 
(1965) . 
1° Cf. City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 
429 U.S. 167, 175-176 (1976). 
We know of no documenta.tion of the apparent view of the Massachu-
setts Legislature that corporations are likely to share a monolithic view 
on an issue such as the adoption of a graduated personal income tax. 
Corporations, like individuals or groups, are not homogenous. They range 
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the suppression is necessitated by governmental interests of 
the highest order. We next consider the interests advanced 
in this case. 
IV 
The constitutionality of § 8's prohibition of the "exposition 
of ideas" by corporations turns on whether it can survive the 
!'exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First 
Amendment rights." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 44-45 
(1976). Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed 
at speech itself 20 and speech intimately related to the process 
{)f governing, "the State may prevail only upon showing a sub-
·ordinating interest which is compelling," Bates v. City of 
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); see NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438-439 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 463 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U. S. 516, 530 ( 1945), "and the burden is on the government 
to show the existence of such an interest." Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). Even then, the State must employ 
means "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment .... " 
Buclcley, supra, at 25; see NAACP v. Button, supra, at 438; 
·'Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960). 
from great multinational enterprises whose stock is publicly held and 
traded to medium-size public companies and closely held corporations 
controlled by an individual or family. It is arguable that small or 
.-medium-size corporations might welcome imposition of a graduated per-
sonal income tax, which might impose a. greater share of the tax burden 
on wealthy individuals. See Brief for New England Council as amicU8 
•curiae 23-24. 
20 It is too late to Sl.lggest "that the dependence of a communication on 
the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element 
or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 16; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
'376 U. S., at 266. Furthermore, § 8 is an "attempt directly to control 
speech ... ra.ther [than] to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some 
interest clea.r!y within the sphere of legislative concern." Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U. S. 513, 527 (1958). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S., 
367 (1968). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court did not subject § 8 to "the 
critical scrutiny demanded under accepted First Amendment 
and equal protection principles," Buckley, supra, at 11, because· 
of its view that the First Amendment does not apply to appel-
lants' proposed speech.21 Indeed, the exact interests served 
by § 8 are not identified, let alone discussed, in the court's 
opinion.22 Appellee nevertheless offers two principal justifi-
cation for the prohibition. The first is the State's interest in 
sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the elec-
toral process and the citizen's confidence in government. The 
second is the interest in protecting the rights of shareholders 
whose views differ from those expressed by management on 
behalf of the corporation. However weighty these interests 
may be in the context of partisan candidate elections/8 they 
21 The court justified its deferential standard of review more explicit.Jy 
in its discussion of appellants' equal protection claim: 
"We think the appropriate standard of review on this issue is not the 
strict scrutiny that the plaintiffs suggest is apposite but, rather, is the 
traditional scmt.iny involving economic matters. While we agree with the 
plaintiffs that where free speech is involved st rict scmtiny is required ... , 
we have already concluded that the plaintiffs do not possess First Amend-
ment rights on matters not shown to affect materia.lly their business, prop-
erty or assets." - Mass., at -, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1275 (citations 
omitted). 
22 The court did advert to the interests served by § 8 in rejecting a.ppel-
lants' equal protection argument. It reasoned that the inclusion of busi-
ness corporations in § 8, but not entities such as unincorporated associa-
tions, pa.rtnerships, labor unions, or nonprofit corporations, might be 
attributable to the fact that the latter entities do not have shareholders: 
"Section 8 could represent a legislative desire to protect such shareholders 
again~1 ultra vires activities." - Mass., at -, 359 N. E. 2d, at 1275. 
The court found justification for the noninclusion of other entities that 
have shareholders, such as businC'ss trusts and rec'\.1 estate investment trusts, 
in the supposition that "the Legislature may just ifiably have concluded 
that such trusts did not present the type of problem in this area presented 
by general business corporations." Ibid. The court did not specify which 
"type of problem" it meant. 
23 In addition to prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures 
for the purpose of influencing the vote on a ballot question submitted to 
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either arc not implicated in this case or are not served at all, 
or in the least restrictive manner, by the prohibition in § 8. 
A 
Preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing 
corruption, and "sustain [ing] the active, alert responsibility 
of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct 
of government" 24 are interests of the highest importance. 
Buckley, supra; United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 
U. S. 567, 570 (1957); United States v. C/0, 335 U. S. 106, 
139 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Burroughs v. United 
States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934). Preservation of the individual 
citizen's confidence in government is equally impo17tant: 
Buckley, supra, at 27; Civil Service Comm'n v. National Assn. 
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,565 (1973). 
Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his 
view that these interests are endan,gered by corporate par!' 
ticipation in discussion of a referendum issue. They hinge 
upon the assumption that such participation would exert an 
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and-
in the end-destroy the confidence of the people in the demo-
·cratic process and the integrity of government. It is said that 
corporations are wealthy and powerful, and that their views 
may may drown out other points of view. If appellee's argu-
the voters, § 8 also proscribes corporate contributions or expenditures "for 
the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination or antago-
nizing the interests of any political party." See n. 2, supra. In this 
respect, the statute is not unlike many other state and federal laws regu-
. lating corporate participation in partisan candidate elections. Appellants 
·ao not. challenge the constitutionality of laws prohibiting or limiting cor-
porate contributions to political candidates or committees, or other means 
· of' influencing candidate elections. Cf. Buckley v. V aleo, supra; United 
·states v. Pipefitters Local No. 562, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v. 
United Auto . Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 
. U. S. '106 (1948). 
24 United States v. United Auto. Workers, supra, at 575. 
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ments were supported by record or legislative findings that 
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine 
democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving 
First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our 
.attention. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 390 U. S., 
at 395. But there has been no showing that the relative voice 
of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in 
influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been 
.any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government. 
<Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,388 (1962). 
Nor are appellee's arguments inherently persuasive or sup-
ported by the precedents of this Court. Referendum votes 
-are on issues, not on candidates for public office. The risk of 
, ~orruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections, 
e. g., United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U. S. 567 
(1957); United States v. C/0, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), simply is 
not present in a popular vote on a public issue.25 To be sure, 
corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; 
this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may 
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The 
25See Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F. 2d 844, 851 (CA2 1974); C&C Ply-
wood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (Mont. 1976), appeal docketed, 
No. 76-3118, CA9, Sept. 29, 1976; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Berkeley, 60 
Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976); Advisory Opinion on Con-
stitutionality of 1975 PA 227, 396 Mich. 465, 491, 493-495, 242 N. W. 2d 
·3, 10, 14-15 (1976). 
Appellee contends that the State's interest in sustaining the active role 
of the individual citizen is especially grea.t with respect to referenda 
·because referenda. involve the direct pnrticipa.tion of the people in the 
·lawmaking process. But far from inviting greater restriction of speech, 
the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if anything, 
'increases the need for "the Widest. possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
2'76 U. S., at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 
20 (1945)); see Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., 
at 390. 
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Constitution "protects expression which is eloquent no less 
than that which is unconvincing." Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents, 360 U. S., at 689.26 Moreover, the people in our 
democracy, are entrusted with the responsibility for judging 
and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.27 
They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and 
credibility of the advocate.28 But. if there be any danger that 
26 We noted only recently that "the concept that gowrnmcnt ma:y 
' restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
' the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... " 
; Buckley, supra, at 48-49. 
27 Government is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest 
the people lose their ability to govern themselves. See Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). See also Buckley, supra, a.t 57; Meikle-
john, The First Amendment is an Ab ·olute, 1961 S. Ct .. Rev. 245, 263. 
The First Amendment rejects the "highly paternalistic" approach of stat-
''utes like § 8 which restrict what the people may hear. Virginia State Bd. 
,of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U. S., at 
770; see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U. S., 
at 97; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
The State's paternalism is illustrated by the fact that Massachusetts 
does not prohibit lobbying by corporations, which are free to exert as much 
influence on the people's representatives as their resources and inclina-
tions permit. Presumably the legislature thought its members competent 
to resist the pressures and blandishments of lobbying, but had markedly 
less confidence in the electora.t€. If the First Amendment protects the 
right of corporations to petition legislative bodies, see California Motor 
Transp. v. Trucking Unlinitted, 404 U. S. 508, 510-511 (1972); United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954); Eastern R. R. Presidents Conf. v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 137-138 (1961), there hardly 
can be less reason for allowing corporate views to be presented to the 
people when they are to ta.ke action in their sovereign capacity. 
28 Corporate advertising, unlike some methods of participation, in politi-
cal campaigns, is apt to be highly visible if it is to serve its purpose. 
Identification of its source may be required as a means of disclosure, 
thereby minimizing a kind of "undue influence" that concerns appellee. 
See generally Buckley, supra, at 66-67; United States v.llarriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 625 (1954). 
.. 
76-1172-0PINION 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON v. BELLOTTI 23 
the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments 
put forth by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the 
Framers of the First Amendment. Wood v. Georgia, supra. 
In sum, "[a] restriction so destructive of the right of public 
discussion [as § 8], without greater or more imminent danger 
to the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible 
with the freedoms secured by the First Amendment." 20 
B 
Finally, the State argues that § 8 protects corporate share-
holders, an interest that is both legitimate and particularly 
within the province of state law. Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 
82-84 (1975). 30 This is belied, however, by the provisions 
of the statute, which are both under- and over-inclusive. In 
addition, the State has failed to employ means of achieving 
its objective that would be less restrictive of First Amend-
ment rights. 
The under-inclusiveness of the statute is self-evident. Cor-
porate expenditures with respect to a referendum are pro-
hibited, while corporate activity with respect to the passage 
or defeat of legislation is permitted, see n. 31, supra, even 
though corporations presumably engage in lobbying more 
often than they take positions on ballot questions submitted 
to the voters. Nor does § 8 prohibit a corporation from 
·expressing its views, by the expenditures of corporate funds, 
on any public issue until it becomes the subject of a refer-
endum, though the displeasure of disapproving shareholders 
is unlikely to be any less. 
The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been 
singled out for special treatment undermines the likelihood of 
a genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It sug-
2o Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945). 
3° The State may not assert such an interest with respect to appellant 
banks, however, which are creatures and instrumentalities of the Federal 
Government. Seen. 14, supra. 
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gests instead that the legislature may have been concerned 
with silencing corporations on a particular subject. Indeed, 
appellee has conceded that "the legislative and judicial history 
of the statute indicates ... that the second crime was 'tailor-
made' to prohibit corporate campaign contributions to oppose 
a graduated income tax amendment." Brief for Appellee 6. 
Nor is the fact that § 8 is limited to banks and business 
corporations without relevance. Excluded from its provisions 
and criminal sanctions are entities or organized groups in 
which numbers of persons may hold an interest or member-
ship, and which often have resources comparable to those of 
large corporations. Thus the exclusion of Massachusetts 
business trusts, real estate investment trusts, partnerships, 
'labor unions, and other associations undermines the plausi-
bility of the State's purported concern for the persons who 
happen to be stockholders in the banks and corporations 
·covered by in§ 8. 
The over-inclusiveness of the statute is demonstrated by the 
· fact that § 8 would prohibit a corporation from supporting 
· or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders 
authorized the contribution or expenditure.31 Ultimately 
shareholders may decide, through the pr0cedures of cor-
porate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in 
debate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect 
the board of directors or to insist upon pFotective provisions 
· 'in the corporation's charter, shareholdeFB normally are pre-
sumed competent to protect corporate interests of the kind 
·here at issue. In addition to intra-corpora.te remedies, minor-
ity stockholders have access to the judicial remedies of a 
B1 Appellee1s contention that nothing less than a requirement of unani~ 
mous sha.reholder approval would safeguard adequately the rights of 
·minority shareholders reflects a nova! view of corporate democracy. 
:Appellee does not explain why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are 
· entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others 
where equally important corporate derisions a.re made by management or 
by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders. 
. 
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derivative suit or an ultra vires action to challenge corporate 
disbursements alleged to have been made for improper cor-
porate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of 
management. 
Assuming, therefore, that protection of shareholders is a 
"compelling" interest under the circumstances of this case, we 
find no "substantially relevant correlation between the govern-
mental interest asserted and the State's effort" to prohibit 
appellants from speaking. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S., 
at 485. 
v 
Because § 8 prohibits protected speech in a manner unjus-
tified by a compelling state interest, it must be invalidated. 
The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
,·opinion . 
It is so ordered. 
